

(1100)  
30 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion of U.S. Government Pre-Election  
Activity in Chile at Department of State,  
19 January 1970

PRESENT: Mr. John H. Crimmins  
Mr. Frederic L. Chapin  
Ambassador Wymberley Coerr  
Mr. James R. Gardner  
Ambassador Edward M. Korry  
Mr. William V. Broe

1. Mr. Crimmins started by saying that the purpose of the meeting is to go over the pitch to be made to the 303 Committee, Mr. Broe adding that the two recent recommendations from the Santiago Embassy were also to be discussed, and Mr. Crimmins referred to the ambassador's telegram of 23 December 1969 as well. Mr. Crimmins said that the present 303 draft sent over to State in December gives him several concerns, which came out in their doing a redraft for Alexis Johnson. His controlling concern is the sensitization in Chile following the military alarms and excursions. His concern is intensified because of two underlying factors: one is the sensitivity to CIA in Chile now and another is the assumption in Chile that in the election the U.S. would be pro-Alessandri. Secondly, Mr. Crimmins from the beginning has questioned the need for us to be involved in these concerns. Noting that Secretary Meyer shares these views, Mr. Crimmins was going to draft a telegram to Ambassador Korry to discuss the above points but did not do so because of Mr. Broe's suggestion to have this meeting. Mr. Broe

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said that he is interested in learning whether the two points recently recommended by the ambassador are new, in the embassy's eyes, or part of what was going on before.

2. Ambassador Korry thought that Mr. Crimmins' concerns were natural and useful for the proposals needed thought and even monthly review. The two matters would be interpreted as pro-Alessandri, which is bothersome. Ambassador Korry went on to define the only interest that he can see for the U.S. in Chile, which is, are we going to have a popular front or Marxist government in Latin America? Secondly, there is a time factor involved in this.

[REDACTED] In the short term, went on Ambassador Korry, the station has done very well in sowing suspicion between the PR and the communists. Mr. Crimmins asked how much of the current disarray is due to agency activity and Ambassador Korry said that this cannot be quantified. [REDACTED] thought it had contributed. He referred to the aim of [REDACTED] and to encouragement of PDR activity, and he described the use of leaflets recently in [REDACTED]. He mentioned the poster campaign, [REDACTED]

3. Ambassador Korry described his recent meeting with Minister of Education, Maximo Pacheco Gomez, who is the main channel from Frei to the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) as well as Frei's main channel to Alessandri. Following other topics discussed at the meeting, Pacheco asked for Ambassador Korry's reaction to the desirability of the PCCh maintaining Neruda as its candidate. Ambassador Korry said he told Pacheco it was a good idea. Pacheco went on to say that it would strengthen Radomiro Tomic, and claimed that Tomic would pick up votes among the socialists, meaning here splinter groups, such as that of Raul Ampuero, as well as from some Radicals, and from some other renegade Socialists. Ambassador Korry told Pacheco that anything is good in our eyes which strengthens the center. Pacheco did not ask for support in terms of money but Ambassador Korry did ask Pacheco how the PDC thought it could encourage the Neruda candidacy.



and Pacheco said he did not think the PDC could. Pacheco could see no role for the U.S. in this either, when Ambassador Korry asked him. Ambassador Korry then congratulated Pacheco for the anti-PCCh leaflets recently scattered in Valparaiso, and Pacheco did not deny that the PDC was responsible. Ambassador Korry thinks that Pacheco may now be thinking that someone in the PDC did do this. It was in this same conversation that Pacheco asked about the economists from the U.S. whom Alessandri has hired, as Pacheco assumed this to be a U.S. operation. It was noted for Mr. Crimmins' information that this is not a U.S. or CIA operation and no one knows exactly who these people are. Ambassador Korry would like to get these people out of Chile and to tell Pacheco that they are not "ours."

[REDACTED] Ambassador Korry thought that in the next few months the operation would have served its purpose, for either Allende will have come out as the sole candidate of the left or the disarray in the left will be permanent. He noted that Tomic still has unrealistic plans for reuniting the left. [REDACTED] injected that he hoped to maintain the disarray of the left through election day. Mr. Crimmins asked if Neruda would continue to run and Ambassador Korry said that there is no real prospect for a Neruda candidacy, but that we are planting seeds now for continuing dissension even after the Neruda candidacy has been withdrawn. [REDACTED] noted that whatever happens the left will be a reduced alliance.

4. Mr. Crimmins defined the maximum objective, that of having the popular front effort collapse [REDACTED] Less than that would be to have a candidate agreed to by the Socialists and the PCCh but the other four splitting off or some of them splitting off from the front. Secondly, there is the object to have its appeal lessened, if there is a popular front party. Ambassador Korry offered a third objective: that of isolating the PCCh. Ambassador Korry went

on to say that, short of the death of Alessandri, or some such decisive event, he does not expect the left to win the election, despite the potent force of an Allende candidacy. Mr. Crimmins, because of some disagreement over this point, asked for the current judgment on the vote if Alessandri, Allende, and Tomic are the candidates. Ambassador Korry put their chances for winning in that same order, noting that this can change. He thinks that Alessandri will not rise, for he starts near the top and he may decline. It will be rough for him to get over 35% of the vote, with each point over that being very hard to get; Tomic starts at the bottom with some 25% and he will have similar difficulty in increasing his percentage. This leaves some 30% of the vote to the left, according to Ambassador Korry, and Mr. Crimmins then noted this leaves some 10% undecided. Ambassador Korry agreed that some 10 - 15% of the vote is floating and crucial. Mr. Broe noted that this is the nub of the proposal to the 303 Committee. Ambassador Korry said that this is why the Radical vote is important. Ambassador Korry explained that he feels an Alessandri victory would be bad for U.S. interest, as he sees it bringing on a military government, and thus, to help Alessandri come to power is not in the ideal interest of the United States. Mr. Crimmins described our proposed role, then, as one of assisting unwillingly and collaterally in an Alessandri candidacy and hampering a popular unity candidacy and continuing to cause dissension on the left.

5. Ambassador Coerr asked how Ambassador Korry would view an Allende victory. Ambassador Korry immediately commented that the Chilean military would accept it and [redacted] agreed. Ambassador Korry went on to say that such a victory would weaken the PDC; then there would be serious internal division in a new government because of traditional socialist and communist rivalry for contact with the masses. A part, perhaps a majority, of the PDC would be attracted to the Socialists and would support Allende against the communists. Ambassador Coerr commented that an Allende victory, then, is not the same as a communist victory. Ambassador Korry agreed with the distinction but said that one must treat it as the same thing. Ambassador Korry thinks it would be very imprudent to act as if an Allende government would be anything but another



Castro government, and one should assume that at a minimum the Allende government would act in this style. Ambassador Korry said that they say they will preserve personal liberty but he does not believe it. He would assume that at least the press would be muzzled. (He noted that the embassy is not dealing with the prospects for Allende in the current CASP, only mentioning it as a contingency.)

6. Mr. Crimmins asked what difference it would make if we sat on our hands, seeing how sensitive our involvement can be versus what we may gain from this involvement. Ambassador Korry said that he would not be unhappy if we did nothing, but if Allende were to win, in the end, how would we answer the question about what effort we made to prevent this? Mr. Crimmins did not think this a good reason for involvement, in itself. Mr. Broe commented that if CIA withdraws from what it is doing now, then it would have an effect in itself, showing that the U.S. Government is not interested. Mr. Crimmins suggested that such a withdrawal could be explained to Chilean contacts as being on the basis of prudence rather than of indifference.

7. Concerning the chance of leaks occurring in the operation, [redacted] stated that it was quite secure with all reasonable precautions having been taken. [redacted]

[redacted] Mr. Crimmins asked whether Alessandri might claim U.S. support and Ambassador Korry said that he would not, as the claim would not be an asset for him. Mr. Broe noted that the Alessandri people do not know of our role in this election. [redacted] noted that the Alessandri forces are helping to back the PDR [redacted]

Ambassador Korry noted that Tomic and the PCCh each have taken precautions to keep the U.S. out. The PCCh business about CIA is not just a knee-jerk reaction but is aimed to warn us off. Tomic, for his part, wants to be sure that the U.S. does not help Alessandri and is sending Enrique Krauss to see Secretary Meyer about this.

8. Mr. Crimmins attempted to sum up:

- a. There is a chance that our efforts would influence a small but probably critical margin of voters.
- b. This operation can be conducted with justified expectations of considerable security, and
- c. If we don't take this relatively secure opportunity to get this small margin of votes, we are vulnerable to the charge that we are not taking even marginal steps to prevent an Allende victory.

9. Ambassador Korry, commenting on this, said that there is nothing in the military or economic future which the U.S. can do to have any effect on Chile this year. The dropping of our military assistance and our refusal of a program loan have led to the attitude in Chile that the U.S. is out of it. Ambassador Korry added the recent press conference of Secretary Meyer as another reason for this, saying that the Chileans like this attitude of the U.S. but read it as a process of disengagement. [REDACTED] commented that Fuentealba and his ilk draw their own inferences from this. Ambassador Korry said that all sectors welcome the new U.S. policy: it is a popular intellectual view in Chile. Thus we are left with the minimal action taken to minimize the minimal possibility, summarized Ambassador Korry.

10. Ambassador Coerr asked [REDACTED] which would be the weakest point in the security of the operation. [REDACTED] volunteered the idea that [REDACTED] although [REDACTED] did not appear to think this the most likely occurrence. Ambassador Korry said that even if this happened, the results would be small, because [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED] Ambassador Korry commented that we can't destroy the PR, for the communists did that. Ambassador Coerr asked if the money was used for buying votes and Mr. Broe said that it is not.

[REDACTED] Mr. Crimmins asked if [REDACTED] has had success and [REDACTED] said that he has; Ambassador Korry said that the structure of the PR is already in disarray and this is an opportunity to be mischievous. [REDACTED]

11. Mr. Crimmins asked about the propaganda operation and how it works, remembering that our interest is anti-FRAP. Mr. Broe said that there are several uses for this organization, one of which is to put out a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The group also buys radio time, pays for political advertisements, and prepares posters, separately from those produced by the CIA station. Mr. Crimmins wanted to pursue the question of at what point the pro-Alessandri content might overshadow that of the anti-FRAP motive. Ambassador Korry said this must never happen but he wanted the product monitored to be sure that it would not, which [REDACTED] promised to do. Mr. Crimmins did not see how monitoring could prevent the pro-Alessandri people from taking a pro-Alessandri approach. [REDACTED] said that the terms of the engagement are these: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] understand that the purpose is to maintain tensions in the leftist camp, not to support Alessandri. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mr. Crimmins asked if the [REDACTED] is funded by us. [REDACTED] replied that we take care of [REDACTED] Ambassador Coerr asked if these people are known to be pro-Alessandri. [REDACTED] explained the way the [REDACTED]

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Ambassador Korry said he is ready to take responsibility for anything CIA does and feels any other stance a mistake. (Earlier Ambassador Korry had promised to tell Mr. Crimmins that while much of what the PDC believed about the CIA in Chile had been told to the PDC, and had been said by members of the U.S. mission, the CIA was not behind this. This is a reference to the style and line taken by Mr. Wheelock, now resigned from the State Department.)

12. Ambassador Coerr said that if the pro-Alessandri stance would bother us, why would not an anti-FRAP posture be embarrassing to us as well? Ambassador Korry replied that Chile assumes we are anti-FRAP. Noting that the PCCh is a foreign-directed party which takes its direction from a foreign power and that no such party in Chile takes orders from the U.S., he considers that Chileans find our being anti-FRAP understandable -- we can deal with an independent Chile but we have problems with a Chile directed by a foreign power.

13. The specific proposals for the 303 were then taken up: (a) support to [REDACTED] (b) support to [REDACTED] (c) support to the propaganda group, (d) additional activity carried on by the station [REDACTED] such as the production of leaflets, [REDACTED] and the production of posters, these last activities have been going for some time and will continue after elections are over. Mr. Crimmins noted that Ambassador Korry had proposed the points (a and b) above plus funding of one-shot opportunities. Ambassador Korry felt that this target of opportunity approach should be pursued in the field to avoid the embassy's having to come back for permission every time for every little thing. Mr. Crimmins wanted this review to reflect those points, along with the personal nature of [REDACTED] Ambassador Korry wants to be able to [REDACTED]

Mr. Crimmins agreed and wanted it understood that if the [REDACTED] departed from its anti-FRAP line that we would back out of it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Mr. Crimmins wanted these points reflected in the 303 paper. Mr. Gardner asked why, in all this, we did not consider help to Tomic. Ambassador Korry answered, first, that the PDC does not want it, and that helping them would hurt us, for he feels that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and thirdly, a good case would not be made for helping the PDC. Concerning the last, he would think that a Tomic government would do a number of things repugnant to the U.S.; at which point the U.S. Government would ask, why did we help Tomic? Ambassador Korry said that we need a center victory. Ambassador Coerr wanted to know how [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Finally, Mr. Crimmins said that he is prepared to go along with the proposals within the limits discussed.

[REDACTED]  
Deputy Chief  
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[REDACTED]  
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